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Ill.

INTRODUCTION

The Idaho Supreme Court ("Court") exercises free review over questions of law interpreted
by the Idaho Industrial Commission ("Commission"). Recognizing that this standard of review grants
no deference to the Commission's interpretation of statutes or case law, the defendants have
characterized this appeal as one in which the claimant is merely asking to Court to re-weigh the
evidence. However, the claimant is simply asking the Court to determine if the Commission properly
applied LC. §72-439 when it concluded that claimant's occupational disease claim was not
compensable. Notably absent from the Commission's decision, as well as the defendants' briefing
on appeal, was any discussion of the Sundquist case, which is critical to any discussion regarding LC.
§72-439 in an occupational disease claim.
Specifically, the Commission stated that the claimant needed to prove both colonization and
infection with :MR.SA while working for the employer to make a successful occupational disease
claim. R. p. 85-86. However, this finding is contrary to the guidance in Sundquist interpreting LC.
§72-439(1) which states it is possible for a disease to be "incurred" by a claimant under a series of
different employers before it becomes manifest. Sundquist v. Precision Steel & Gypsum, Inc., 141
Idaho 450,456, 111 P.3d 135, 141 (2005). If this were not the case, any occupational disease claim
could be easily defeated if it involved a claimant who worked for more than one employer, as the
surety would always argue the disease was incurred with a prior employer in an attempt to avoid
responsibility. It was for this reason that LC. §72-439(3) explicitly sets out that in such a case, "the
surety on the risk for the employer, in whose employment the employee was last injuriously
exposed to the hazard of such disease, shall be liable therefor."

It follows that utilizing the framework set out above, it was improper for the
Commission to require the claimant to prove both MRSA colonization and infection while
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employed by Dime Clinic/Heritage Health ("Heritage Health"). Instead, the Commission
should have only required the claimant to prove injurious exposure to MRSA at Heritage
Health as the Commission already concluded that, "The weight of the evidence has shown
that Claimant is at increased risk for MRSA colonization due to his profession, and that his
infection began while working for Employer." R. p. 85, ,r47. While there was no discussion
of injurious exposure as the term is used in I.C. §72-439(3) in the Commission decision in
this case, in an earlier decision from January 2011, the Commission clarified the standard
used when interpreting "last injurious exposure" when it stated:
The Commission concludes that in order for the last injurious exposure rule to apply, it
must first be demonstrated that the employment in question did in fact expose the injured
worker to the hazard of contracting the occupational disease at issue. Next, in order for that
employer to be held liable under the last injurious exposure rule, it must be demonstrated
that the hazard to which the injured worker was exposed actually did contribute, however
slightly, to the development of the disease, and Claimant's eventual disability. In the Matter
of Murray Burns, Decedent Marelyn Burns, Claimant, IC 2010-003881, 2011 WL
344594, at *11 (Idaho Ind. Com. Jan. 4, 2011) (emphasis added).
With this additional background concerning the proper application of I.C. §72-439 as previously
discussed in Sundquist and Burns, it becomes clear that the. Commission incorrectly applied the
law in this case, requiring a remand back to the Commission for further findings of fact and
conclusions of law.
IV.

ARGUMENT

1. The Commission erred as a matter of law in requiring Claimant to prove

MRSA colonization and MRSA infection while working for Employer

In the present case, the Commission was unnecessarily focused on a need for the claimant to
prove MRSA colonization at Heritage Health. R. p. 85-86. Specifically, the Commission found that:
There is no evidence to suggest that Claimant was colonized with MRSA within eight months
of his infection, to the exclusion of his former employment. (For example, there is no
evidence that Claimant was checked for MRSA at the time he was employed by Employer,
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and found to be MR.SA free.) Each of Claimant's past employments since 2009 carried the
risk of colonization." R. p. 85, ,r48.

[I]t cannot be said that Claimant has produced evidence which established that it was more
probable than not that he was colonized and infected with MR.SA while working for Employer
from October 2012 through June 2013. While certainly not all of the above listed events are
equally likely to have been the culprit for Claimant's MRSA infection, only one eventClaimant's employment with Employer-would allow Claimant to obtain compensation
under Idaho worker's compensation statutes. R. p. 86, ,r49.
This focus on proving colonization with MR.SA at Heritage Health is contrary to the entire concept
of occupational disease claims for health care workers, where it frequently takes years during which
numerous job changes occur, before a worker is diagnosed with an occupational disease. See CE 2,
p. 8-14. In this situation, it is important to recall that an occupational disease claim does not arise
until it first manifests. See Sundquist v. Precision Steel & Gypsum, Inc., 141 Idaho 450, 454, 111
P.3d 135, 139 (2005).

Moreover, because in Idaho's worker's compensation law the word

"incurred" means" 'arising out of and in the course of employment," it is as much a reference to
cause as to a particular point in time. See I.C. § 72-102(21)(b). Accordingly, as an occupational
disease develops over time, it is possible for the disease to be "incurred" by a claimant under a
series of different employers before it becomes manifest. See Sundquist v. Precision Steel &
Gypsum, Inc., 141 Idaho 450,456, 111 P.3d 135, 141 (2005).
In this case, it is clear that claimant's MRSA infection manifested while claimant was
employed at Heritage Health and the Commission explicitly made this finding of fact when it
stated, "The weight of the evidence demonstrated that the claimant was at increased risk for MRSA
colonization due to his profession, and that his infection began while working for the employer."
R. p. 85, ,r47. When the Commission's finding that the claimant was at increased risk for
MRSA colonization due to his profession was combined with the finding of manifestation of
the MRSA infection at Heritage Health, it became completely unnecessary for the
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Commission to conduct an inquiry as to whether claimant could have been colonized with
MRSA in a prior employment. This error of law was then compounded when the Commission
utilized the lack of certainty regarding whether the MRSA colonization occurred with a prior
employer as a factor in a causation analysis. R. 85-86, ,I49. That the Commission failed to
mention Sundquist in its decision is telling as to how far astray the Commission ventured from
established case law.
A useful case illustrating the proper application of LC. §72-439(3) where an occupational
disease is "incurred" by a series of employers as discussed in Sundquist before it manifests is In

the Matter of Murray Burns, Decedent Marelyn Burns, Claimant, IC 2010-003881, 2011 WL
344594. In that case, the claimant made an occupational disease claim for pleural mesothelioma.
While the defendants agreed that claimant suffered from an occupational disease, they asserted
that they were not liable for the claim due to application of LC. §72-439(3).

As a result, the

Commission undertook a study of what standard various jurisdictions utilized to interpret the "last
injurious exposure" rule contained in LC. §72-439 before determining that:
The Commission concludes that in order for the last injurious exposure rule to apply, it
must first be demonstrated that the employment in question did in fact expose the injured
worker to the hazard of contracting the occupational disease at issue. Next, in order for that
employer to be held liable under the last injurious exposure rule, it must be demonstrated
that the hazard to which the injured worker was exposed actually did contribute, however
slightly, to the development of the disease, and Claimant's eventual disability. In the
Matter of Murray Burns, Decedent Marelyn Burns, Claimant, IC 2010-003 8 81, 2011 WL
344594, at* 11 (Idaho Ind. Com. Jan. 4, 2011) (emphasis added).
A lengthy discussion of the various levels of proof required to show "last injurious exposure" is
discussed in Liberty Nw. Ins. Corp. v. Montana State Fund, 2009 MT 386, 353 Mont. 299, 219
P .3d 1267 (2009), mentioned in the Burns case. In Liberty, the Supreme Court of Montana adopted
a "potentially causal" standard when utilizing the last injurious exposure rule:
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Under this approach, the claimant who has sustained an OD and was arguably exposed to
the hazard of an OD among two or more employers is not required to prove the degree to
which working conditions with each given employer have actually caused the OD in order
to attribute initial liability. Instead, the claimant must present objective medical evidence
demonstrating that he has an OD and that the working conditions during the employment
at which the last injurious exposure was alleged to occur, were the type and kind of
conditions which could have caused the OD. Liberty Nw. Ins. Corp. v. Montana State
Fund, 2009 MT 386, ,r 24, 353 Mont. 299,308,219 P.3d 1267, 1273, (2009).
It is believed that the issue of which standard to use when utilizing the last injurious exposure rule
may be an issue of first impression in Idaho. If the Court addresses this issue, when determining
whether to adopt the "potentially causal" standard or the standard currently utilized by the
Commission in Burns, the claimant requests that the Court consider the purpose of the workers'
compensation law to provide sure and certain relief and liberally construe LC. §72-439(3) in favor
of the claimant, by adopting a "potentially causal" standard as utilized by neighboring states Oregon
and Montana.
However, regardless of the standard utilized to interpret the last injurious exposure rule, it
is necessary that this case be remanded to the Commission for further findings given the
Commission's legal error that required the claimant to prove MRSA colonization at Heritage
Health in direct contravention of LC. §72-439 as previously interpreted in Sundquist. On remand
to the Commission, it should be recognized that the unrebutted evidence in this case demonstrates
that the claimant's only known MRSA exposure was the claimant's last injurious exposure when
he treated MRSA colonized patients at Heritage Health, for weeks both before and after the cat
scratch referenced in the Commission's decision, as stated by claimant's nurse Deborah Gutierrez,
rendering this a compensable occupational disease claim. R. p. 82, ,r39; CE 7, p. 53; CE 25, p. 2514.
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V.

CONCLUSION

It is the policy of worker's compensation statutes to encourage "sure and certain relief for
injured workers." I.C. §72-201. The provisions of the Workers Compensation law are to be liberally
construed in favor of the employee. Sprague v. Caldwell Transportation, Inc., 116 Idaho 720, 779
P.2d 395 (1989).

The humane purposes which it serves leave no room for narrow technical

construction. Ogden v. Thompson, 128 Idaho 87, 910 P.2d 759 (1996).
Based on the argument presented herein, this case should be remanded to the Industrial
Commission with instructions to reconsider the evidence in accordance with proper application of
the law as set out in I.C. §72-439 and subsequent case law interpreting that statute to include
Sundquist. The Commission should then determine on a more likely than not basis whether the

Claimant was last irtjuriously exposed to MRSA while treating patients at Heritage Health, instead
of requiring the Claimant to prove both MRSA colonization and MRSA infection during the period
he was employed at Heritage Health.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMIITTED this 19th day of April, 2017.

epen}kmec, ISB No. 7591
Attorney for Claimant-Appellant

APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF -6

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the
19th
day of
April
, 2017, two
true and correct copies of the foregoing document were served upon the following individuals by the
method indicated below:
H. James Magnuson
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